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International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from  the 1990s
Simon J. Evenett, Margaret C. Levenstein, and Valerie Y. Suslow'
1. INTRODUCTION
In its  1997 Annual Report, the World Trade Organization (WTO) highlighted the growing
significance of international cartels for policymakers, noting "there are some indications that a
1  Simon J.  Evenett is  an  Economist in the  Development Research Group, World  Bank; Moderator of  the
Brookings Roundtable on Trade  and  Investment Policy;  and Research Affiliate of the  CEPR.  Margaret C.
Levenstein is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts and Albion College; Adjunct
Associate Professor of Business Economics at the University of Michigan; and Faculty Research Fellow at the
National Bureau of Economic Research.  Valerie Y. Suslow is Associate Professor of Business Economics at the
University of Michigan.  The views expressed in this paper are personal and do not represent those of any of the
institutions with which the co-authors are affiliated. We thank Gabriel Casteneda, Carsten Fink, Bob Hahn, Peter
Holmes, Gary Horlick, Morris Morkre, Mirvat  Sewadah, Spencer Weber Waller, and Mark Warner for their
constructive comments and suggestions.
1growing proportion  of  cartel agreements are  international in  scope." 2 Increasing  trade
liberalization may, by increasing competition in formerly protected national markets, have
increased firms'  incentive to  participate in cartels.  These cartels undermine international
integration and decrease the benefits of liberalization to consumers.  International cartels may
also undermine political support for liberalization if citizens believe that private barriers to
trade are simply replacing government-created  ones.
Our analysis of recent  investigations and prosecutions of  international cartels  yields two
findings.  First, cartels are neither relics of the past nor do they always fall quickly under the
weight of their own incentive problems. Even where cheating eventually undermines a cartel,
consumers may have been burdened by years of increased prices, and enduring barriers to
entry have often been created by strategic cartel behavior.  Second, aggressive prosecution of
cartels can deter collusion, but only where sufficient international cooperation exists to gather
evidence and prosecute offenders so that cartel participants actually have something to fear.
In what  follows  we argue for a more comprehensive approach to  attacking distortionary
cartels in the international marketplace.  Prevailing national anti-cartel policies are oriented
towards addressing the harm done in domestic markets, and in some cases merely prohibit
cartels without taking strong enforcement measures.  In this paper we propose reforms to
national policies  and  to  international cooperative arrangements that  will  strengthen  the
deterrents against international cartels and reduce the strategic creation of entry deterrents.
Section 2 of this paper discusses three types of international cartels. Section 3 examines two
types of international cartels that were active over the last decade: illegal "hard core" cartels
and legal export cartels.  We provide an overview of the prevalence and characteristics of
these cartels and discuss the long-term effects of cartel-created barriers to entry.  In Section 4
we examine the deterrent effect of current national competition laws, and in section 5 we
assess the recent experience with bilateral cooperation in international cartel investigations.
Finally, in Section 6 we address the role that the WTO (or other international body) might
play  in  promoting competition.  We discuss other modifications to  national  competition
2  WTO (1997), p. 40.
2policies to the same effect.  We argue that the criminalization of price-fixing is critical to
deterring prospective international cartels and for gathering evidence to  prosecute existing
cartels.  Furthermore,  we  argue  these  aggressive measures  must  be  complemented by
vigilance in other areas of competition policy, such as merger reviews and investigations of
collaborative ventures between corporations. Otherwise, firms will respond to the enhanced
deterrents to cartelization by combining with or acquiring rivals or by taking other measures
that lessen competitive pressures.
2.  TAXONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
a.  Three Types of International Cartel
There are a wide variety of organizations that could plausibly be described as international
cartels, and to structure the analysis in this paper we distinguish between three types: Type 1
are the so-called "hard core" cartels made up of private producers from at least two countries
who cooperate to control prices or allocate shares in world markets. Type 2 are private export
cartels where independent, non-state-related producers from one  country take steps to  fix
prices or engage in market allocation in export markets, but not in their domestic market. 3
Type 3 are state run, export cartels. 4
Although we briefly comment on policies toward export cartels, we restrict the greater part of
our analysis to Type 1 cartels. 5
b.  The Basics of Cartel Performance and Implications  for Antitrust Policy
The economic theory of cartels has two implications for antitrust policy that are particularly
germane to  this  discussion.  First,  economic theory identifies the incentive to  sell above
3Note,  however,  that not all export associations  allocate  market  shares  or fix prices. In his study  of US firms
which formed  export associations  that were reported  under the Webb-Pomerene  Act, Dick (1996) found that
about twenty percent engaged in neither  of these activities; their cooperation was limited to promotion and
marketing.
4 For a broader account of the different types of anticompetitive horizontal arrangements between firms (which is
not focused exclusively on the international dimension) see Lande and Marvel (2000).
5 State-run export cartels (Type 3 cartels) are motivated by a range of political as well as economic factors that
distinguishes their behavior and effects from the profit-maximizing corporations that form private international
cartels (Type 1 cartels) considered here.
3agreed quotas, or below cartel prices, as a source of instability underlying all cartels.  This has
implications for how governments might allocate scarce antitrust resources, since one might
want to identify which firms are most likely to be able to overcome the incentive to cheat and
direct  antitrust  resources  there.  Unfortunately,  economic  theory  does  not  identify
deterministic relationships between industry or firm structure and  cartel success.  Rather,
theoretical  advances have  established that  an  infinite number  of  outcomes  are possible,
ranging from perfectly competitive prices to perfect collusion. 6 In addition, the success or
failure of a cartel in an industry is likely to depend on a host of factors, such as the legal
environment, demand  for  the  products  in  question, the  terms  of  the  cartel  agreement,
managerial  skill, and  industry  history.  Worse  still,  some  of  these factors  are inherently
unobservable. Aware of these difficulties, Sutton (1998) argues that  a "bounds"  approach
should guide empirical analysis of cartels. This approach recognizes that there are certain
necessary but  not sufficient conditions for cartel success, which  bound the  circumstances
under which successful cartelization can occur. 7 Outside of the bounds entry may be "too
easy" or coordination "too difficult" for a cartel to survive in a particular industry.  Inside the
bounds, cartels may succeed.  One implication of this  view  is that antitrust  enforcement
should focus its resources on industries inside these bounds.
All else  equal, international cartel agreements are more likely  to  fall  inside the  bounds
because national borders are a straightforward way to divide up international markets. The
ability to monitor competitors increases the likelihood of cartel success-and  firms in  an
international cartel can monitor exports and imports, using published trade and customs data.
If these heightened incentives to cartelize outweigh any difficulties associated with organizing
a  conspiracy  among members that  have different  cultures or  languages, then this  is  an
argument for focusing antitrust resources on international cartels.
The second implication of cartel theory for antitrust policy also stems from cartels' underlying
fragility.  A successful cartel must take actions to counteract the incentive to defect.  Such
actions  include  mechanisms  to  increase  the  cost  to  defection:  making  cheating  more
6 See Sutton  (1998)  and Tirole (1988)  for the relevant theoretical  analyses.
4observable; making  cheating more difficult to  undertake; creating mechanisms  to  punish
cheating.  Cartel  agreements can  also  include  mechanisms  that  increase  the  returns  to
cooperation, such as the creation of barriers to entry.  The longer a cartel operates the more
likely  that  it  will  establish  industry  practices  or  barriers  that  facilitate  anticompetitive
practices in the future.  Barriers to entry created by the cartel, either through tariffs, patent
pools, or distribution agreements will not necessarily disappear with the cartel's  demise and
may well limit future entry and stifle innovation.  Firms may move beyond cartel conspiracies
to outright mergers, achieving in essence a more stable and consolidated cartel. Therefore, in
addition  to  the  classic  (static) deadweight  losses, over  time  cartels  are  likely to  distort
resource allocation through other means.
Looking forward a little, in section 4 we describe how antitrust policy can take advantage of
the  ever-present incentive problems faced by cartel members. Measures can be  taken  to
increase these members'  incentives to defect, to limit the mechanisms by which cartels can
punish defectors, and to prevent the creation of barriers to entry.  And in the next section, the
potential for strategic behavior by cartel members (during and even after a conspiracy has
been terminated by competition authorities) suggests that a more collaborative approach to
tackling international cartels is required than is currently employed.
3.  CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
a  "Type 1 " International Cartels
(i)  International Cartels. Prevalence, Formation, and Duration
There have been numerous recent international price-fixing prosecutions by the US Justice
Department and the European Commission.  From these, we have created a sample that we
believe includes nearly all international cartels that were successfully prosecuted by the US or
the EC for fixing prices during the 1990s.8 These cartels operated in a variety of industries,
7 See also  Evenett  and Suslow  (2000)  and Levenstein  and Suslow  (2002).
8  In order to be included  in the sample,  a cartel  must involve  more  than one producer;  include  firms from more
than one country;  have  attempted  to set prices or divide  markets  in more  than one country;  and begin  or end in
the 1990s.
5including chemicals, metals, paper products, transportation, and services.  Their members
included some of the largest corporations in the world.  The markets affected by these cartels
have annual sales of well over $30 billion. 9
There are forty cartels in the sample with members from over thirty countries (Table 1). The
typical international cartel of the 1990s had firms from two or three countries.  Some cartels
included firms from four or five countries, and, in the cases of shipping cartels, as many as
thirty countries.  As expected, given that these are DOJ and EC cases, most of the alleged
conspirators are European and US firms. It is not unusual, however, to find Japanese or South
Korean participation.
Cartels, being secretive organizations, rarely announce their formation.  Empirical research on
cartel formation is therefore limited to evidence gathered from cartels operating in a legal (or
tolerant)  environment or  from  evidence  collected in  antitrust  prosecutions.  Theoretical
research on the timing of cartel formation has focused on the effects of business cycles on
cartel formation.  The available evidence on the formnation  of the 1990s international cartels
suggests that these cartels often were formed following a period of declining prices, but these
price declines were not  generally associated with macroeconomic fluctuations (Levenstein
and  Suslow  2001).  Anecdotal  industry  evidence suggests that  they  were  the result  of
increasing competition and market integration.'I
Figure 1 shows the pattern in duration for 1990s sample of international cartels.  The average
duration of cartels in the  1990s sample of DOJ and EC prosecutions is 6 years."  Some of
these cartels lasted for two decades before antitrust intervention. Other cartels lasted less than
a year.  Twenty-four of these forty cartels lasted for at least four years, certainly long enough
9 Due to lack of data, this figure includes revenues for only about half of the industries in Table 1.
10  Levenstein  and Suslow  (2002)  reaches  a similar  conclusion  when  analyzing  a different  sample  of international
cartels.  Most of the cases they study report cartel formation during a period of falling prices, but this is not
always, or even usually, associated with falling demand.
"  This measure probably understates the duration of these cartels as it reflects the public, legal record of the
years for which the  member firns  were  found or  pled guilty to cartelization.  The actual start  of a  cartel
agreement may precede the starting date alleged in public documents because an antitrust authority may not have
had strong enough evidence of a cartel's initial operations or the authorities may have chosen not to bring that
evidence to court as part of  a  plea arrangement. For these two reasons  our measure understates the  actual
6to have had a significant impact on consumers.  This finding is consistent with conclusions
drawn from other samples of cartels.  Average duration is generally in years, not decades;
there are cartels that do survive decades, others that can't get started, and many in between.
Levenstein and  Suslow's (2002) survey of  cross-section studies of historical international
cartels comes to a similar conclusion.  The mean cartel episode length in these studies varies
from 4  to  8  years, with  a  range from one  year to  several decades.  This high  variance
undoubtedly reflects both true variation in cartel longevity and scholars'  selection bias for
either very successful, long-lived cartels or those with an interesting history of on-again off-
again episodes.  Whatever the biases involved, it is clear that cartels are not "short" or "long"
lived; they are both.  There are also industries that followed the pattern of the Canadian oil
industry, in which the failure to sustain collusion led to consolidation of the industry (Grant
and Thille 2001).  In the next section, we look at this issue and its antitrust implications more
closely.
(ii) Strategies for Survival: Building Barriers to Entry and Deterring Defections
The potential profits associated with successful cartelization create a financial rationale for
firns  to  devise  means  to  overcome the  short-term  incentive  to  deviate  from  a  cartel
agreement;  to  frustrate  entry  by  new  firms;  and  to  prevent  detection  by  competition
authorities.  Some  cartels have turned even to government policies to  achieve their ends,
employing anti-dumping laws, quotas, regulations, or import surveillance, and other forms of
statistical reporting.  Cartels have also employed a variety of private measures, including
vertical restraints or the use of a common sales agent, patent pooling, joint ventures, and
mergers (either during or after the conspiracy period).
For the most part, the public record on 1990s price-fixing cases does not discuss measures
taken to block entry.  Perhaps this is because such evidence is not necessary for a criminal
conviction in the US, where price fixing is per  se illegal.  However, there are many examples
duration  of collusion. See Suslow (2001) for a fuller discussion  of measuring  the duration  of international
cartels.
7of activities that may have been attempts to deter or block entry in these and other industries
(Table 2).
Some cartels turned to government restrictions to block entry by outsiders., 2 For example,
China has presented vigorous competition in the world citric acid industry, which is otherwise
highly concentrated.  US producers twice tried to use anti-dumping duties to insulate the US
market from Chinese imports of citric acid, once during a cartel conspiracy and once after.
Both times the  petition was denied.  Producers in the ferrosilicon  cartel pursued  similar
tactics, using US anti-dumping duties to protect the cartel from Chinese and other imports
(Table 2). "
Technological restrictions are also used to maintain cartel market power.  For example, steel
producers that were fixing the price of steel beams "restrict[ed] the flow of information ...  in
order  to  freeze  out  any  new  competitors,"  according to  Karl  Van  Miert,  a  former  EC
competition commissioner. 14 In another recent case, members of a graphite electrode cartel
"agreed  to  restrict  non-conspirator  companies'  access  to  certain  graphite  electrode
manufacturing technology."'  5 These cases build on a history of cartel attempts to restrict
information about technology to create barriers to entry.  16
Finally, there is case-specific evidence of the use of strategic alliances and joint ventures to
limit or control entry. One of the most striking examples is in the Oil Country Tubular Goods
(OCTG) market, which are the  seamless steel pipes used in the oil and gas industry.  In
December 1999, the EC convicted four European and four Japanese steel manufacturers of
price fixing.  No evidence was found indicating that they blocked entry or potential entry into
the OCTG market.  However, since the breakup of the cartel, every member of the cartel has
joined  one of three international alliances.  The largest of these, with a 25 percent market
"2This section  draws  on research  by the authors  on a few  cases  selected  from  Table  2.  See Levenstein  and
Suslow (2001).
'3  Pierce (2000) provides an account of the ferrosilicon case  and more generally on how petitions  for relief
against dumping can, in his view, facilitate cartelization.
4 "European Commission Fines Steel Makers $116.7 Million" Wall Street Journal  Europe  February 17, 1994.
15 "Japanese Subsidiary Charged with International Conspiracy to Fix Prices for Graphite Electrodes in the US"
US DOJ Press Release, February 23, 1998.
16 See, for example, Reich (1992).
8share of world OCTG, is led by Techint. Techint controls Dalmine, the Italian member of the
cartel, Tamsa, a Mexican tube producer, and Siderca, an Argentine steel producer.  They are
known jointly  as the DST group.  Tamsa is currently under investigation by the Mexican
Federal Competition  Commission for  abuse of monopoly power  (in  a  case that  appears
unconnected to the EC charges).  NKK, another leading producer and former cartel member,
has formed an alliance with DST, as has a Canadian producer.  Three of the Japanese ex-
conspirators  have  formed  an  alliance  in  which  they  use  a  single joint  sales  agency.
Mannesmann and Vallourec, the German and French cartel members, have formed a joint
venture to which they have transferred all their OCTG production.  They are also engaged in
steel tube joint ventures with Corus (formerly British Steel), another former cartel member
that has exited the OCTG market.
These kinds of activities might be particularly effective in limiting the entry of producers
from developing countries.  In several commodity chemicals markets, incumbent firms have
been willing to accommodate Chinese entry since the break-up of a cartel, but they have done
so  by  establishing joint  ventures  between  former  cartel  participants  and  their  Chinese
competitors. These arrangements give Chinese producers access to the world market, but may
do so at some cost to competition.  Of course, both entrants and established producers could
have other, welfare-enhancing motives for joint ventures, such as sharing technology, local
market expertise, or capital.  These explanations for joint ventures are not mutually exclusive,
but joint ventures (and mergers) in industries known to have a history of international price
fixing should be carefully scrutinized by regulatory authorities.' 7
We have presented evidence of anti-competitive actions taken by contemporary international
cartels to create barriers to entry through mergers and joint ventures, and to manipulate certain
governmental policy tools, such as protective tariffs and anti-dumping duties, either during or
after  a  conspiracy.  While  some  of  these  actions  may  be  appropriate  under  certain
circumstances, their appearance in an industry that has recently attempted to cartelize should
raise concern about possible anti-competitive effects.
17 There  are several  industries,  including  bromine  and steel,  that appear  in both  the 1990s  cartel sample  and the
historical  sample  of a century  before. See  Levenstein  (1997).
9b. "Type 2" Export Cartels
(i)  Legal Status
Export cartels are associations of firms that cooperate in the marketing and distribution of
their product to foreign markets.  The competition laws of virtually all countries exempt such
export cartels from prosecution by domestic authorities.  A summary of these exemptions is
provided  in  Table  3.  In  some legislation,  exemptions  for  export  cartels  are  explicitly
motivated by mercantilism: a desire to  increase national exports and give national firms a
competitive advantage relative to firms based in other countries. In most cases, however, this
exemption is implicit in national competition laws, which cover only those activities affecting
the domestic  markets and typically export activities are presumed not to  affect  domestic
markets. Several countries do, however, provide specific exemptions from domestic laws for
cartels that would otherwise violate domestic laws as long as their activities are restricted to
export markets.  Japan, Mexico, and the United States all have such legislation. Japan and the
US require that export cartels register with a governmental agency to  receive an antitrust
exemption.  In most  cases, however, no registration is required, so there  is very  limited
information regarding the number or activities of export associations.
When the US passed the Webb-Pomerene Act in  1918, which exempts American  export
cartels  from  some of  the  U.S. legal  provisions  against cartelization, most  of  its  trading
partners did  not  prohibit  cartels.'8 The US  was then a  relatively small player  in  many
international markets, and those markets were effectively controlled by legal international
cartels dominated by large European producers. Foreign cartels took actions to bar entry from
non-members, but US firms were not allowed by US law to join these international cartels.
US firms were therefore blocked from exporting to these markets.  In such an environment,
exemptions  for  export cartels  were  most  likely  export-promoting, even  if  they  did  not
necessarily increase competition in foreign markets much.
18 Subsequently,  the Export  Companies  Trading  Act of 1982 provided  further  legal exemptions  to registered  U.S.
export  cartels.
10Presently, the likely effect of these exemptions for export cartels is to make it more difficult
for national governments to exchange information and evidence regarding the activities of
suspected international cartels. This is because nations are reluctant to provide information
about those acts that their exporters engage in which they consider to be legal under their own
laws.  However,  recent  reforms  of  competition  law  in  EC  countries  have  restricted  or
eliminated export cartel exemptions in some member states.  For example, Germany's  new
competition law explicitly omits its earlier provision for exemption and registration of export
cartels.  The UK's  1998 competition law omits mention of the Fair Trading Law's provisions
for exemption and registration of export cartels.
Where countries have provided explicit exemptions for export cartels these do not appear to
be widely used by international cartels.  For example, there is no mention of the existence of a
Webb-Pomerene Association in any of the recent international cartel convictions obtained by
the US Justice Department.' 9 The registration requirement may deter cartel participants from
availing themselves of the exemption.  Firms engaged in price-fixing may prefer secrecy to a
limited immunity that might bring them to the attention of competition officials.
(ii)  Prevalence of Export Cartels
Few countries require that firms organizing an export association formally register with the
government  (Table  3).  It  is  therefore almost  impossible to  track the  number  of  these
associations internationally. In the US, however, the Webb-Pomerene and the Export Trading
Company Acts require registration with a federal agency.  The number of registered Webb-
Pomerene associations in the US hit a peak of 62 in 1930, and has declined fairly steadily
through the years.20 By 1989 the number of Webb-Pomerene associations had declined to
twenty-four. Put into context, this number is quite small and represents only a fraction of US
trade.  Dick reports that these associations covered 2.3% of US exports in 1962 and a mere
1.5% in  1976.2'  The limited information available from other countries shows a  similar
19  However, the European Commission took action against a cartel of U.S. wood pulp producers, whose cartel
was registered in the U.S. under the Webb-Pomerene Act.
20Unfortinately, we have not been able to obtain data on the number of associations registered under the Export
Trading Company Act.
21 Dick (1992), p. 97.
11pattern.  The OECD reported in  1984 that between 1972 and  1982, the number of export
cartels in the UK held constant, the number in Germany declined slightly, and the number in
Japan declined markedly. 22
(iii)  Activities of Export Cartels
In some cases, exporting firms cooperate by engaging in price fixing: either agreeing to sell
their exports at the same price or to sell them through a single, joint sales agency that will
accomplish the same thing.  Firms may also use cooperative export organizations to jointly
market products.  While the latter type of activity may lessen competition, it may also allow
firms  to  achieve sufficient  scale to  participate in  foreign markets.  In  many cases,  this
outcome is more pro-competitive than the mergers or joint  ventures to  which firms might
otherwise turn to achieve the necessary scale for global competition.  Consequently, policies
toward export cartels ought to distinguish between the various motivations for cooperative
export organizations.
Where countries do require reporting or registration of cooperative export organizations, it
may be possible to determine which activities such organizations engage in.  Several studies
by Andrew Dick find that US Webb-Pomerene Associations had little anti-competitive effect
in part because they also served to lower the cost of exporting. 23 One reason for the limited
use of these associations by recent international cartels may be that they consist only of US
exporters, with little ability to control other nation's markets.
(iv)  Anti-Competitive Effects of Export Cartels
The anti-competitive impact of export cartels may be more significant in some markets or
countries than others.  For example, at a recent meeting of competition policy-makers at the
OECD, some countries voiced concern "that export or import cartels could inflict [harm] on
trade and market access ... and argued that such cartels should lose any exemption they might
enjoy from national competition law.  Others ... questioned the importance of such cases and
argued that  ...  such  exemptions do  not  immunize such  cartels from  prosecution by  the
22 OECD (1984).
12affected country.  Others pointed out that affected countries might have difficulty obtaining
the necessary evidence located abroad ... 524  A recent article in the Journal of Competition
Law and Policy made a similar point, arguing that Mexico has been harmed by the activities
of legal export cartels based in other countries.  While prosecution of these cartels is possible
under  Mexican law the  lack of  cooperation from  other countries means that  information
gathering is difficult and prosecution almost impossible. 25
There is little mention of legal export cartels in recent reports on international antitrust from
the  OECD and  the U.S.  International Competition  Policy Advisory Committee. 26 This
suggests that certain leading members of the American antitrust community do not feel that
this is an issue that severely affects consumers or those domestic producers who compete with
foreign export cartels.  The OECD's  report on Hard  Core Cartels "urges  ...  reviews by
competition authorities ... of [export cartel] exclusions [but] does not regard further action in
this area to be  a priority in connection with its program for bringing about more effective
action against hard core cartels" (OECD 2000a, p. 28).
Having laid out the main features of contemporary international cartels, and conveyed a sense
of their prevalence in  the  1990s, we now examine the effectiveness of  current anti-cartel
enforcement regimes.
4.  THE DETERRENCE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT
Before assessing the recent increase in international cartel investigations, it will be useful to
lay out-from  a traditional "law  and economics" perspective-the  incentives supplied by
national anti-cartel enforcement regimes and penalties. 27 This analysis will then motivate a
discussion of the inadequacies of national anti-cartel enforcement in a world of many legal
jurisdictions.
23 Dick (1992, 1996).
24 "Summary"  OECD  Journal  of Competition  Law  and  Policy 1:4  (1999),  p. 10.
25  Wise (1999), p. 67.
26  ICPAC (2000) and OECD (1999).
27  For a  recent exhaustive survey of the law and  economics literature see Kaplow and  Shavell (1998).  Our
discussion focuses on the  incentives supplied by  public enforcement practices.  Private  suits-brought  for
damages by cartel victims-that  are permitted in some jurisdictions, may reinforce these incentives.
13From the law and economics perspective the objective of anti-cartel laws should be to deter,
and where necessary punish, firms who engage in this undesirable act. 28 Three characteristics
of cartels are germane to understanding the incentives supplied by anti-cartel enforcement.
First, cartels typically involve secret agreements between firms.  Second, the objective of
these agreements is to secure pecuniary gains for cartel members.  Third, sustaining the cartel
requires careful attention to crafting incentive compatible agreements between firms.
A group of firms will be collectively deterred from cartelizing a nation's  markets if  that
countries' antitrust authority is expected to fine them more than the gains from participating
in the cartel.29 Assuming that the firms are risk neutral; there are no costs to the firms in
defending themselves before a fine is imposed; the pecuniary gain from cartelization equals
G; and the probability of the antitrust authority detecting and punishing the cartel equals p,
then a fine f that equals or exceeds (G/p) will provide the necessary collective deterrent.  An
important insight is  that  even though cartel  agreements are typically  secret-and  so the
probability of detection and punishment p is low-so  long as p  is positive there exists a fine
that will collectively deter cartelization.30 Secrecy may impede investigations, but deterrence
is still in principle feasible.  These arguments may also provide a rationale for why some
nations, such as the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, have made the maximum fines
for cartel members a function of the pecuniary gain from their illicit activity. 3'
28  As a testament to the influence of this perspective it is worth noting that the Ministry of Commerce in New
Zealand recently published a report on the effectiveness of the deterrence provided by that nation's enforcement
practices and courts which was explicitly built on the lines of reasoning discussed in this section. See Ministry of
Commerce, Government of New Zealand (1998).
29  It is theoretically possible that a cartel agreement reduces the costs of its members. (Indeed, should such an
agreement result in considerable reductions in the marginal costs of the parties to that agreement then, compared
to a  perfectly competitive  benchmark, the  formation of  a  cartel could be  welfare  improving.) Under these
circumstances Landes (1983) demonstrated that the optimal fine should be based on the net harm to consumers,
rather than on the total pecuniary gain to the cartel members. In the absence of such cost reductions, the net harm
to consumers will exceed the pecuniary gain to cartel members, and so basing fines on the forner  could form the
basis of an effective deterrent also.
30  This simple calculation can be extended in a number of  ways, see Government of New Zealand (1998).
Perhaps the most important extension is to include enforcement costs, which leads to the finding that the optimal
enforcement of cartels may result in some less distortionary cartels not being prosecuted. We thank Bob Hahn
for reminding us of this point.
3' Although this section focuses on the deterrent effect of state antitrust enforcement, it should be borne in mind
that some jurisdictions permit private suits by those entities whose interests are hurt by a cartel. In principle, the
expectation of damages won by those interests can act as a deterrent to cartelization too.
14Antitrust  officials have exploited the "incentive compatibility" problems faced by cartels
through the  introduction of  corporate leniency programs.  These programs-which  offer
reduced penalties to  qualifying firrns that come forward with evidence of cartel conduct-
induce  members  to  "defect"  from  cartel  agreements.  These  programs  have  also  been
motivated by  the observation that the successful prosecution of cartels  typically requires
evidence supplied by at least one co-conspirator. 32
The US corporate leniency program, last revised in 1993, can be rationalized in these terms.
Currently only the first  firm to come forward with evidence about a currently uninvestigated
cartel is automatically granted an amnesty from all US criminal penalties.  This encourages a
"winner takes all" dynamic, where members of an otherwise successful cartel each have an
incentive to be the first to provide evidence to US authorities. 33 A second feature is that even
if a firm is not the first to approach the US authorities, such a firm can gain a substantial
reduction in penalties by admitting to cartel practices in other markets that are (at the time of
the application for leniency) uninvestigated.  This provision has set off a "domino" effect in
which one cartel investigation can result in evidence for subsequent investigations.  Since
these changes, and others,  were introduced the US has received on  average one  amnesty
application per month, approximately twelve times the previous rate.
Jurisdictions differ considerably in whether they impose criminal penalties in cartel cases.  In
particular, few jurisdictions  permit the incarceration of business executives responsible for
cartelization. 34 US officials strongly believe that criminal penalties including the threat of
incarceration are essential  deterrents to  cartelization. 35 How  does  a  law  and economics
32  At the core of such leniency programs lies the incentive to give evidence in return for reduced (or even no)
punishment for criminal acts. Some members of the Bar have pointed out that this incentive may well distort the
information offered to enforcement authorities and the statements that former conspirators are willing to make in
court. See "The World Gets Tough on Price Fixers," New York Times, June 3, 2001, section 3, pages 1  ff.
33  The German Bundeskartellant (Federal Cartel Office) revised their corporate leniency program in April 2000
to include such a provision too.  Dr. Ulf Boge, President of the Bundeskartellant, argued in explicitly economic
terms as follows: "By granting a total exemption from fines to the first firm that approaches us we want
to induce the cartel members to compete with each other to defect from the cartel."  See Bundeskartellant (2000).
34  Although the  criminality of cartel behavior has considerable implications for international cooperation and
evidence sharing, the role of these sanctions as a deterrent is what concerns us presently.
35 See, for example, Hammond (2000) who argues: "based on our experience, there is no greater deterrent to the
commission of cartel activity than the risk of imprisonment for corporate officials.  Corporate fines are simply
not sufficient to deter would-be offenders. For example, in some cartels, such as the graphic electrodes cartel,
15approach assess this claim?  First, incarceration involves costly losses in and re-allocation of
output: managers' productivity is less during their period of incarceration, and resources must
be devoted to the construction and operation of prisons.  If these were the sole considerations,
then incarceration would be  a less desirable alternative to fines.  However, given the low
probability of punishing a cartel and the sizeable gains from engaging in such behavior, the
minimum fine that would deter a cartel may in fact bankrupt a firm or its senior executives.
Bankrupting a firm that has been engaged in cartel behavior could actually reduce the number
of  suppliers  to  a  market,  resulting  perversely  in  less  competition  and  higher  prices.
Furthermore, personal bankruptcy laws bound from below what corporate executives can lose
from  anti-cartel enforcement.  Incarceration may provide-through  the  loss  of  freedom,
reputation, social standing, and earnings-the  only remaining means to alter the incentives of
corporate executives.  This  argument is  particularly  important because the  use  of  stock
options  in  executive  compensation packages  provides  very  strong  incentives  to  senior
executives to maximize firm earnings and stock market value.
The  second "law  and  economics"  argument is  that  incarceration is  needed to  reduce  or
eliminate the expected harm caused by repeat offenses.  There may be legitimate concern that
executives who have successfully arranged explicit agreements to  carve up a  market will,
after the cartel is broken up, attempt some other form of anti-competitive practice.  The
imposition of  fines alone may not  induce a firm's  shareholders to  replace the  offending
executives, especially if the latter can convince shareholders that the fine was a "cost of doing
business"  and that  the benefits from implicit collusion (which they expect to  secure in a
market that is well known to them) will soon flow.  Here, a clean break with the past may be
needed, with incarceration simultaneously removing the relevant executives from their posts
and acting as a threat to incoming senior executives not to attempt re-cartelization.  Antitrust
officials must  also weigh the stronger deterrent effect of incarceration against the higher
levels of evidence that are required to secure criminal convictions. The threat of incarceration
individuals  personally  pocketed  millions  of dollars  as a result of their criminal  activity. A corporate  fine, no
matter how punitive,  is unlikely  to deter such individuals." Mr. Scott  Hammond  is the Director of Criminal
Enforcement  at the US Department  of Justice. In interpreting  his remarks  it is worth  bearing in mind  that the
maximum  fine under US law for individuals  convicted  in engaging  in cartel behavior  is $350,000  which given
16exacerbates the  difficulties that  national antitrust officials  face  in  securing evidence and
testimony  from  cartel  participants,  which  in  terms  of  the  framework  outlined  above
effectively lowers the probability of detection and punishment p.
The law  and  economics perspective explains why national antitrust  enforcement may be
particularly ineffective in deterring international cartels.  First, the ability of executives to
organize cartels (including attending meetings and the writing and storing of agreements) in
locations outside the direct jurisdiction of the national antitrust authority where the cartel's
effects are felt can effectively reduce the probability of punishment p to zero. For example, in
1994 the US case against General Electric, which along with De Beers and several European
firms were thought to be cartelizing the market for industrial diamonds, collapsed with the
trial judge citing the inability of US enforcement authorities to secure the necessary evidence
36 from  abroad.  Second,  constraints on  the  ability to  collect  evidence  and  to  interview
witnesses abroad imply that the probability of punishment p is lower than it might otherwise
be.  Increasing the finesf imposed may not, given the substantial reduction inp  and the limits
imposed by  bankruptcy, be  sufficient to  deter cartelization.  In  sum,  supplying the right
deterrent is more difficult when conspirators can hatch their plans abroad.
Third, in a world of multiple markets the gain from cartelizing a single additional market may
well exceed the cartel profits from that market alone.  As the number of markets in which a
cartel operates increases, each cartel member can be more successfully deterred from cheating
on the cartel agreement in any one market by the threat of retaliation by other members in all
the markets in which the cartel operates.  This "multi-market effect" implies that the extension
of an international cartel into a new market can raise prices in all of the markets a  cartel
operates in.  Therefore, the fine that will deter cartelization of a new market must take account
of the consequent increase in the cartel's  total profits, not  only on the extra profits being
eamed in the newly cartelized market.  At present, even those antitrust authorities that base
their fines on the illicit gains from cartelization do not consider the cartel's gains from outside
their jurisdiction and so current practices are unlikely to deter multi-market cartels.
recent  trends  in executive  compensation  is likely  to be much less  than  the potential  stock-option  and other  gains
paid  to an executive  whose  firm's profits  have  increased  due  to participating  in a cartel.
17Finally,  the  effectiveness  of  national  leniency  programs  is  compromised  by  firms'
participation in cartel activities in many nations.  A firm may be reluctant (to say the least) to
apply for leniency in a single jurisdiction if that leaves them potentially exposed to penalties
in other jurisdictions.  Furthermore, even though a firm may be willing to offer evidence on
cartel activities in many nations, a national antitrust authority will only value information on
activities within its jurisdiction.  Both factors reduce the benefits of seeking leniency.
5. RECENT TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT
The 1990s saw a sea change in official attitudes towards cartel enforcement.  At the start of
the  decade, only  one  industrial nation-the  United  States-was  taking aggressive  action
against international cartels, and these actions were  criticized by other governments as an
improper extraterritorial  application of  domestic  U.S.  antitrust laws. 37 By  decade's  end,
several high  profile enforcement actions have convinced policymakers in  other industrial
countries  that  stronger  measures  against  international  cartels  ought  to  be  taken.
Consequently,  corporate  leniency programs  have  been  revised  or  introduced  in  several
countries, international norms for and reforms of cartel enforcement have been proposed at
the OECD, and bilateral cooperation developed between a few jurisdictions.
Much of this  change had  its origins  in the  events that followed the revision of the  US
corporate leniency program in 1993. As noted above, this revision led to a dramatic increase
in international cartel prosecutions.  Although US  enforcement actions were  motivated by
their  effects within US borders, the potential cross-border effects of these cartels  and the
substantial  evidence  proffered  during  leniency requests  did  not  go  unnoticed  in  other
nations. 38 The European Commission introduced its own corporate leniency program-but  its
36 Waller (2000).
37 Concerns about extraterritorial applications of these US laws reached a point where several industrial countries
lictually passed "blocking statutes," whose intent was to  prevent their  antitrust authorities, police and  other
national  investigative agencies, and firms from cooperating with US enforcement actions  outside American
borders. The changing attitudes of antitrust officials to extraterritoriality are detailed and then discussed in First
(2001).
'8 US officials have, through speeches, interviews, and written articles, extensively discussed their enforcement
record in this area. In part, this effort is motivated by the view that the deterrent effect of the US enforcement
regime depends somewhat on its public profile. Many of these speeches can be downloaded from the web site of
the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice (www.usdoj.gov/atr). A cynic might argue that the $1.7
18success has been less impressive than its US counterpart in part because automatic amnesty is
not assured to the first firm that reports cartel behavior. 39
Although cartel enforcement has increased in both the EU and in Japan, investigations remain
hampered in both jurisdictions,  albeit for different reasons.  It has proved too  difficult to
reconcile the underlying tenets of the Japanese legal code with the introduction of a corporate
leniency program.  This restricts the flow of information on cartel behavior to the Japanese
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), and is a source of considerable concern, as the JFTC appears
to devote few resources to other means of uncovering cartels.  That said, Japan (and Korea)
have recently reduced the number of permitted exceptions to their anti-cartel laws.
More  vigorous  enforcement in  the EU  has  been  impeded by  the  inability  of  European
Commission (EC) officials to  search the private homes of business executives resident in
Europe  for evidence of cartel agreements.  Worse  still, European Community Law  only
allows civil sanctions on undertakings (such as firms).  Individuals cannot be sanctioned for
antitrust offenses under Community Law but can be subject to penalties under any relevant
national laws.  Even so, since the late 1980s the EC has prosecuted over twenty international
cartels with fines rising to above 100 million ECUs in recent years.
Recognition  of  the  difficulties  faced  by  national  anti-cartel authorities  in  investigating
international cartels has led to several initiatives between governments and within the OECD.
Recent  experience suggests that  there  are two  circumstances where  bilateral  cooperation
offers the most promise (by raising the probability of an international cartel being punished).
First, if a nation's laws make cartelization or conspiracies to cartelize criminal offenses, then
that nation may be able to invoke the provisions of any Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(MLATs) that it has signed with other nations.  These treaties differ in scope  (including
coverage of antitrust offenses) and in the commitment to extend bilateral cooperation.  The
US-Canadian MLAT,  signed in  1985, is perhaps the best  example of how  this  form  of
bilateral cooperation has been effective in prosecuting international cartels (Waller 2000).  Of
billion of fines imposed by the U.S. federal antitrust authorities in the 1990s may well have encouraged overseas
interest in cartel enforcement actions.
19course, this mechanism is only available to those jurisdictions that have signed MLATs that
cover antitrust matters.
The second route by  which cooperation between national antitrust officials  is effected is
through explicit bilateral agreements on antitrust matters.  This route is very much in  its
infancy, and is best characterized by the 1999 agreement between Australia and the US.  This
agreement provides for each party to the agreement to request assistance from the other party
irrespective of whether the alleged corporate actions in question are criminal acts under the
requested nation's  law.  The bilateral assistance envisaged at the time  of signing includes
providing, disclosing, exchanging, and discussing evidence as well as taking various steps to
secure evidence from persons, undertakings, and other  entities.40  Even more recently, a
working  group  of  officials  from  competition policy  authorities  in  the  Nordic  countries
proposed enacting legislation to enable them to exchange pertinent information in cartel cases
(OECD 2000a).
A critical stumbling block in most bilateral cooperative efforts is the exchange of business
information or what many legal practitioners refer to as "confidential business information."41
The fear that corporate secrets and future planning will, if shared with  a foreign antitrust
authority, be used inappropriately or leaked to rival firms has long resulted in many bilateral
cooperation agreements on antitrust  matters containing very restrictive provisions  for the
exchange  of  confidential  business  inforrnation  and  very  broad  understandings of  what
information is considered confidential.  But cartel investigations typically refer to prior (and
occasionally current) corporate practices; the evidence required is largely documentation of
meetings  and  agreements  between  conspirators;  prosecutions  generally  do  not  require
39  It is noteworthy  in this respect  that the German  and British competition  policy authorities  have chosen  to
revise  their corporate  leniency  programs  along  US,  not EC, lines.
40  It should be noted that such assistance  typically  requires  the use of enforcement  resources  in the requested
countries.  Therefore,  the benefits  of enhanced  international  cooperation  should  be compared  to the opportunity
costs of those resources  in other activities,  including  domestic  antitrust  enforcement.  Having said that if the
purpose  of a request  for cooperation  is to obtain  information  that another  agency  has collected,  then sharing of
such information between authorities may save resources in the requesting nation. For example, the Australian
authorities requested and received case materials from the U.S.  on the vitamins conspiracies-saving  the former
considerable time, effort, and expenditures (First, 2001).
41  In the view of some this stumbling block has seriously circumscribed cooperation between the EC and US in
cartel investigations, see Stark (2000) and Waller (2000).
20reference to firms'  forward-looking strategic plans.  Thus, the fear that legal future plans will
be exposed appears to be exaggerated. 42 Finally, existing international cooperation on tax and
financial securities permits for far more exchange of business information than under bilateral
antitrust agreements, especially when there is the suspicion that fraud or some other illegal act
has taken place.  The extension of cooperation to anti-trust matters can easily build on these
existing practices.
Many of the recent reforms in national anti-cartel enforcement and in bilateral cooperation
must be seen against the backdrop of significant and ongoing discussions at the OECD.  In
1998 these discussions culminated in the Council of the OECD adopting a "Recommendation
...Concerning  the  Effective  Action Against  Hard  Core  Cartels." 43 The  essence  of  this
recommendation is two-fold: to call upon member nations to enact anti-cartel laws that can
effectively deter cartelization and to lay out common principles to guide cooperation between
antitrust authorities-cooperation  which the Recommendation clearly endorses as in OECD
members'  interests.  In 2000, the OECD issued another report documenting the steps taken
since the Recommendation was adopted.  This  report noted that while some nations had
eliminated exemptions to their cartel laws, revised corporate leniency programs, or allowed
greater exchange of business information, less progress has been made on facilitating bilateral
cooperation  on  cartel  investigations than  had  been  hoped.  Nevertheless,  these  OECD
initiatives demonstrate an emerging consensus on the undesirability of international cartels-
which may well spur enhanced enforcement actions, both domestic and cross-border.
Taking together  the conceptual concerns (raised in  section 4) about the  effectiveness of
national enforcement measures against international cartels, and the promising yet nascent
bilateral cooperation described above, we conclude that at present the cumulative effect of
national  enforcement systems is  unlikely to  provide sufficient deterrence to  international
cartels.  Several options for reform are considered in the next section.
42  A recent detailed analysis of the arguments  advanced  in support of restricting  the exchange  of business
information  in cartel investigation  by the OECD  came  to a similar  conclusion  (OECD  2000a).
43 This  recommendation  is reproduced  in an appendix  to OECD  (2000a).
216. OPTIONS FOR REFORM
Any proposed reform to international cartel enforcement should be assessed, in large part, on
the deterrent it provides to  firms to  cartelize markets in  the first place.  That deterrent's
strength depends on the firms'  perceptions of the probability of getting punished and the size
of any expected penalty.  Although the pecuniary gains from cartelization may result from
raising prices across the globe, recent enforcement experience suggests that much of the
evidence and many of the people responsible for international cartelization are to be found in
the nations where the headquarters of globally-oriented firms are located.  Table I shows that
those  headquarters tend to  be  situated primarily in  industrial nations.  This  suggests that
although calculations of the pecuniary harm should in principle shift from the national to the
global, at present  reforms  to the "investigative technology" probably need only  focus on
cooperation between the industrial nations.44
As a first response, it is tempting to advocate creating a global enforcement authority with
powers to  collect evidence, conduct interviews, and  then compute the  global gains  from
cartelization and levy the appropriate fines.  In principle, such a proposal could overcome the
deficiencies  of  the  current  system  of  national  enforcement  and  bilateral  cooperation.
However, at this juncture no nation appears ready to pool sovereignty in such an aggressive
manner, or to allow its citizens and firms to be punished by such a body.  The EC's relatively
weak enforcement powers against price-fixing and the like are a testament to the reluctance of
EU members, who have been pooling sovereignty in other areas for decades, to cede powers
in  cartel cases-even  though the distortions to the free flow of goods and services across
European borders that cartels can engender are widely acknowledged. 45 Without denying the
intellectual appeal of such a far-reaching solution, we turn our attention to more modest and
perhaps more likely reform options.
44 However, the growing tendency for firms in developing economies to undertake overseas transactions suggests
that the time may well come when the "investigative technologies" (referred to in the text) should be extended to
beyond the industrial nations.
45 See Waller (2000) for an account of EC anti-cartel enforcement.
22The first and least ambitious reform option would involve extending the US-Canada or US-
Australia bilateral  cooperation agreements on antitrust to  all industrial countries.  Such a
reforn  would go some way to  remedy the current deficiencies in evidence collection and
information sharing, increasing the probability of cartel members being caught and punished.
To ensure some degree of uniformity in the agreed forms of bilateral cooperation, this reform
would probably be best effected through the signing of a plurilateral agreement between these
industrial  nations, rather than through multiple bilateral  agreements.46 Such a plurilateral
agreement need only refer to the modalities of inter-agency cooperation.
The second option builds on the first and tries to address the deficiencies of the current system
of national corporate leniency programs.  The plurilateral agreement (discussed above) would
be  extended  in  two  ways.  First,  a  provision  should  be  introduced  so that  firms  can
simultaneously apply  for  leniency in  multiple jurisdictions  and  have  those  applications
evaluated on the totality of the evidence of cartelization presented.  Second, to reduce the
uncertainty  faced by  the  "first"  firm to  come  forward  with  evidence  about a  currently
uninvestigated international cartel, corporate leniency programs should state the minimum
(non-zero) degree  of  relief  from penalties. 47 Such a  reform would  firther  increase  the
incentive of any cartel member to "defect," making cartelization harder to sustain. 48
Although  these  two  reform  options  can  be  thought  of  as  improving  the  investigative
technology, the pecuniary gains from cartelization would still be calculated on a nation-by-
nation basis.  The third option takes initial steps to  remedying this deficiency.  Once the
investigation turns to the matter of calculating pecuniary gain, this inevitably controversial
step could be turned over to a pre-selected panel of qualified and independent experts, who
reside in the signatories to the plurilateral agreement. 49 This panel would present estimates
46 However,  such  an agreement  would  require  considerable  changes  to the EC's anti-cartel  enforcement  system.
47 For example,  nations  could commit  to give  the first successful  applicant  for leniency  at least  a 50% reduction
in any fines  that are subsequently  imposed.  Of course,  there  is nothing  sacrosanct  about  the 50%  figure.
48 These first two reform  options  do not rule out expanding  the agreement  to allow one antitrust  agency  to take
the lead in a cartel investigation  that  might  have  ramifications  for multiple  jurisdictions,  with  other  parties  to the
agreement  providing whatever assistance is necessary.  This might economize  on enforcement  resources,
potentially  enabling  more  actions  to be taken  within  given  budgets.
49  The fact that such a panel would  consider  the cartel's effects in more than one nation's markets  is not what
makes this step controversial  from an economic  point  of view. Rather,  in order to perform  this task the panel
23(with associated estimated standard deviations) of the cartel's  gains across all the affected
nations that are parties to this agreement. 50 The panel would break down its estimate of the
total gains to the cartel from each nation's markets, which enforcement authorities would take
into account when penalizing cartel members or when making their case to a court to penalize
cartel members.
The obvious disadvantage of this  latter reform option is that  gains from cartelizing non-
signatories' markets are not taken into account.  Given the non-trivial amounts of information
required to come up with a sensible estimate of cartel's pecuniary gains, it is naive to blithely
insist that any supranational panel estimate the global consequences of a cartel.  Instead, this
plurilateral agreement should have open accession clauses to enable non-members that have
developed both  national enforcement capabilities and which have attained a  pre-specified
degree of international anti-cartel cooperation to join.  Furthermore, thought could be given to
informing  non-signatories  that  their  interests  are  affected  by  a  cartel  in  return  for  a
commitment  to  treat  leniently  any  firm  that  has  volunteered  information  during  the
investigative stages. 5'
Taking these proposals together, a reform process could unfold over time in which industrial
countries  move  from  their  current  arrangements  to  the  first  through  third  options.
Strengthening national anti-cartel laws  and commitments to  enforcement are a  necessary
prerequisite.  The enhanced cooperation will foster trust between antitrust agencies, which is
would  have  to estimate  the prices  and quantities  that are likely  to have  prevailed  in the absence  of the cartel.  This
involves making assumptions-which  may be difficult to validate-about  the underlying market structure and
about the  likelihood and nature of strategic interaction between the cartel members that, in the  absence of a
cartel, might have taken place. See White (2001) for a discussion of these issues within the context of the U.S.
actions against the lysine cartel.
50  The panel would  have access only to that  evidence which  is required to  compute  these estimates, and
provisions for confidentiality and restrictions on the use of any information supplied could be established. The
panel could be supported by qualified staff.
l  Even though the  gain calculation would take into account the cartel's  effects in a number of  signatories'
markets,  the fines and penalties  in this third reform  option  would  still be imposed  by national  authorities. This
does not violate the apparent unwillingness of nations only to penalize cartel members for the harm done in their
own jurisdictions.  Requesting, insisting, and even advocating that signatories impose fines on the worldwide
pecuniary  gain-which  includes  the  cartel's  gains  in  non-signatories markets-flies  in  the  face  of  this
established practice.  Countries that allow private civil suits for damages could also expand their jurisdiction in
international cartel cases to allow consumers in countries that were not party to plurilateral agreements to seek
redress in the home countries of the cartel members.
24essential if agencies are to have any faith in the intent and capacity of others to use the ample
discretion  built  into  most  anti-cartel  laws  to  successfully  conduct  international  cartel
investigations.  Admittedly such a process would not immediately lead to the creation of a
supra-national anti-cartel agency, but it does not prevent such an agency from being created
eventually. Furthermore, the experience of mutual cooperation and assistance, combined with
increasing harmonization of antitrust laws would provide the basis for nations to create such
an agency if they should choose to do so. 52
An  alternative to  these  three  reform options that  has  been proposed  is a  plurilateral or
multilateral agreement at the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Such an agreement could
involve  commitments  to  enact  and  enforce  an  anti-cartel  law,  and  to  cooperate  with
investigations  launched  abroad.  As  there  is  less  than  ten  years  of  experience  with
international anti-cartel investigations, it is doubtful that best practices in enforcement have
evolved to such a stage that they could be codified in an agreement. This implies that any
such  multilateral  agreement  would  probably have to  be  based  on  minimum  substantive
standards and  implementation procedures.  Investigative and prosecutorial  discretion  are
likely to  remain  and  it not  obvious how  a  WTO dispute panel  might  assess  whether a
government used that discretion in a manner entirely consistent with the agreement.  The
likely outcome is that only those antitrust authorities that have not followed certain minimal
procedural  steps  would  be  found in  violation, an  outcome  that  is  unlikely  to  result  in
significant increases in the probability that cartel members will be punished.  Finally, such a
WTO agreement is unlikely to ensure that the penalties for cartelization are based on the
worldwide pecuniary gains.  For all of these reasons a WTO agreement is, at present, unlikely
to  remedy the  deficiencies of national anti-cartel enforcement. However, the international
agreements described earlier could provide the basis for strengthening anti-cartel enforcement
in countries that currently are not willing or able to adopt and enforce stronger anti-cartel
laws.
52 First (2001)  makes  a similar  point-namnely  that  recent  cooperative  efforts  to investigate  international  cartels
portend  the development  of international  competition  law.
25A WTO agreement could be crafted (or the GATT agreement amended) to explicitly address
two  forms of  privately-orchestrated and trade-related  cartels. 53 First,  laws which  permit
recession cartels,  where  firms  under  considerable competitive pressure-potentially  from
imports-to  engage in market division, could be banned on the grounds that the WTO already
has well-established safeguard mechanisms. 54 Second, disciplines could be placed on legally-
sanctioned export cartels.  Given the discussion in section 3 there appears to be a justification
for letting small firms share the considerable fixed costs of marketing and  exporting; the
objective should be to prevent such arrangements from resulting in consumer welfare losses.
Two disciplines could be imposed on laws granting exemptions for export cartels: notification
and  unimpeded  entry.  Notification would  involve  the publication  of  the  names of  the
members  of  such  cartels,  which  will  facilitate monitoring  by  antitrust  officials  in  the
importing country.  A requirement that entry to such arrangements be unimpeded would help
both reduce any market power that is enjoyed by existing members, and make coordinating
any restrictive business practices more difficult.
7.  CONCLUSION
International cartels are a nontrivial impediment to  the flow of goods and services across
borders.  Recent enforcement experience suggests that widespread cartelization in  certain
industries has  affected many nations'  markets.  This  might not  be  a concern  if national
antitrust laws provided a sufficient deterrent to intemational cartels-however  both a priori
reasoning and the fragmentary record of international cooperation in this area suggests that
this is not the case.  In particular, three aspects of cartel enfoTcement  need reform.  First, the
probability of a cartel being punished is considerably reduced by the current patchwork of
bilateral cooperation agreements on evidence collection and sharing with foreign jurisdictions.
5  It is a separate,  and important,  matter  whether  WTO-disciplines  should  be imposed  on state-run  export  cartels.
Arguably  these cartels can distort trade flows and the allocation  of resources,  just like privately-run  cartels.
Furthermore,  since  governments  (and  not firms)  are signatories  to WTO  agreements  then it could be argued  that
disciplines  against state-run  cartels  would  be easier  to enforce  than those requiring  governments  to take action
against  domestic  privately-run  cartels.
54  For an overview of the legal statutes on recession cartels in industrial nations see Waller (1996). Feibig (1999)
provides an excellent account of both the use  of crisis (or recession) cartels in Europe and the tendency  for
competition  law  considerations to be  trumped  by  industrial policy  considerations during  acute  periods  of
industry contraction.
26Second, penalties based on national assessments of the pecuniary gains to cartelization are
unlikely to deter cartels that operate in many countries' markets.  Third, vigilance should not
end with a cartels' punishment, as former price-fixers often try to effectively restore the status
quo ante by merging or by taking other steps that lessen competitive pressures and raise
prices.  Unless a  pro-efficiency  approach drives all  competition policy  enforcement, the
benefits created by keen international cartel enforcement will be eroded by lax enforcement in
other areas.
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Source: Levenstein  and Suslow  (2001), Table  1.
31Table  1
COUNTRIES  WITH FIRMS  CONVICTED  OF PRICE  FIXING BY THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DURING THE 1990s
Country  Cartel
Angola  Shipping
Austria  Cartonboard, citric acid, newsprint, steel heating pipes
Belgium  Ship construction, stainless steel, steel beams
Brazil  Aluminum phosphide
Britain  Aircraft, steel beams
Canada  Cartonboard, pigments, plastic dinnerware, vitamins
Denmark  Shipping, steel heating pipes, sugar
Finland  Cartonboard, newsprint, steel heating pipes
France  Aircraft, cable-stayed bridges, cartonboard, citric acid, ferry operators, methionine, newsprint,
plasterboard, shipping, sodium gluconate, stainless steel, steel beams, seamless steel tubes
Germany  Aircraft, graphite electrodes onboard, citric acid, aluminum phosphide, lysine, methionine, newsprint,
_  pigments,  plasterboard, steel heating pipes, seamless steel tubes, vitamins
Greece  Ferry operators
India  Aluminum phosphide
Ireland  Shipping, sugar
Israel  Bromine
Italy  Cartonboard, ferry operators, newsprint, stainless steel, steel heating pipes, seamless steel tubes
Japan  Graphite electrodes, lysine, methionine, ship transportation, shipping, sodium gluconate, sorbates,
seamless steel tubes, thermal fax paper, vitamnins
Luxembourg  Steel beams
Malaysia  Shipping
Mexico  Tampico fiber
Netherlands  Cartonboard, citric acid, ferry operators, Ship construction, sodium gluconate, Tampico fiber
Norway  Cartonboard, explosives, ferrosilicon
Singapore  Shipping
South Africa  Diamonds, newsprint
South Korea  Lysine, methionine, ship transportation, shipping
Spain  Aircraft, Cartonboard, stainless steel, steel beams
Sweden  Cartonboard, ferry operators, newsprint, stainless steel
Switzerland  Citric acid, laminated plastic tubes, steel heating pipes, vitamins
Taiwan  Shipping
UK  Cartonboard, explosives, ferry operators, newsprint, pigments,  plasterboard, shipping, stainless steel,
seamless steel tubes, sugar
US  Aircraft, aluminum phosphide, bromine, cable-stayed bridges, cartonboard, , citric acid, diamonds,
ferrosilicon, Graphite electrodes, isostatic graphite, laminated plastic tubes, lysine, maltol,
methionine, pigments, plastic dinnerware, Ship construction, ship transportation, sorbates, Tampico
_  fiber, thermal fax paper, vitamins
Zaire  _  Shipping
Source: Levenstein  and Suslow  2001,  Table 1. Note:  Products  in italics  are currently  under  investigation.
32Table 2
EVIDENCE FROM HISTORICAL  CASE STUDIES AND FROM RECENTLY PROSECUTED  CARTELS:
ARE CARTEL MEMBERS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE BARRIERS TO ENTRY?
Industry  Conspiracy  Dates (approximate  Does  anecdotal  evidence  point  to firms  accommodating  entry  or creating  barriers  to
dates  for recent  cartels,  first  year  entry? If so, how?
of cartel  for historical  studies)
Bromine  1885  Raising  pharmaceutical  standards;  vertical  rent sharing/exclusive  contracts
Bromine  1995-98  Appear  to be accommodating  entry  of developing  country  producers. Establishing  joint
________________________  .. ventures.
Cement  1922  Vertical  integration
Diamonds  1870s  Vertical  integration
Citric  Acid  1991-95  Firms  tried  to block entry  by twice  requesting  anti-dumping  duties  to protect  the US market
from  Chinese  citric  acid imports. Once  during  the conspiracy  (in 1995),  and once  after
(1999).  Both times  the petition  was  denied.
Ferrosilicon  1989-91  Five  of the six major  US manufacturers  pled guilty  and  were fined. These  same
manufacturers  asked  for antidumping  duties  to  be placed  on Brazil,  China,  and other
countries  as well. These  tariffs  were  approved  and levied  in 1993-94.  When  the
International Trade Commilission  found out about the price-fixing conviction, however, they
reversed  the tariffs. The Commission  said  that  industry  leaders  had  been  fixing  prices
during  the very  time  period  that  they  had testified  that  there was intense  price-based
competition.  (Charleston  Gazette,  8/28/00)
Graphite  Electrodes  1992-97  Cartel  agreement  specified  that firms  agreed  to restrict  non-conspirator  companies'  access
to certain  graphite  electrode  manufacturing  technology.
Ocean  Shipping  1870s  Deferred  rebates  for  customers  conditioned  on cooperation  with  cartel;  predatory  pricing
Oil  1871  Tariff
Parcel  Post  1851  Vertical  rent sharing;  network  economies;  1st  mover  reputation
Railroad/Oil  _  1871  Vertical  rent sharing
Seamless  Steel  Tubes  (Oil  1990-95  Appear  to be accommodating  entry. Several  cartel  participants  have,  since  the breakup  of
Country  Tubular  Goods)  the cartel  by the European  commission,  entered  into  joint ventures  with  firms  based  in
developing  countries.
Steel  Beams  1988-94  Restricted  flow  of information  in  order  to freeze  out any  new competitors
Vitamins  1990-99  No direct  evidence  of creating  barriers  to entry,  other  than  a request  for  anti-dumping
duties  in 1999  (no  decision  yet?). After  the breakup  of the cartel,  mergers  of cartel
members  were  approved  by competition  authorities.
Source:  Historical  case  studies  based  on Levenstein  and  Suslow  (2002),  Table 16. Recent  cartel  evidence  based  on Levenstein  and Suslow  (2001).Table 3
National Exemptions  to Competition Law for Exporters 55
Country  Exemption  Reporting Requirement
Canada  Export activities that do not affect domestic competition  None
Estonia  Activities  that do not affect  the domestic market  None
Germany  Repealed by 1999 amendments  to the Act Against  Notification and approval requirements
Restraints of Competition  depend on the nature of the exemption
Hungary  Activities that do not affect  the domestic market  None
Japan  Agreements regarding exports or among domestic  Notification and approval of industry
exporters  administrator required
Latvia  Activities that do not affect the domestic market  None
Lithuania  Activities that do not affect the domestic market  None
Mexico  Associations and cooperatives  that export  None
Portugal  Activities  that do not affect the domestic  market  None
Sweden  Activities that do not affect the domestic market  None
United Kingdom  Apparently  removed by 1998 Competition Law  Formerly, agreements  had to be furnished
to Director General of Fair Trading
United States  Webb-Pomerene  Act: Activities that do not affect  Webb-Pomerene  Act: Agreements must
domestic competition  be filed with FTC
Export Trading Co Act: Exemption similar to W-P  Export Trading Co. Act: Certificate of
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement  Act - Exemption  Review provided by Commerce Dept
from Sherman  and FTC acts
55  Information  above is drawn from OECD (1996), American Bar Association (1991), and OECD (2000b).
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